Real Safety AI Foundation / Research

AI-Induced Psychosis and Mental Health

Civil Rights Pathways for AI-Induced Psychosis

Publisher: Real Safety AI Foundation

Legal research article.

Written
June 2026
Version
v14
Pages
58

Abstract

Large language model platforms operated by OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Character Technologies have generated a documented pattern of severe psychological harm to users with pre-existing mental health vulnerabilities, including completed suicides attributed to prolonged engagement with conversational AI systems. The plaintiffs’ bar has pleaded these cases as product liability, negligence, and state-law consumer protection claims, and every such case reaching the settlement stage has settled without precedent. This Article argues that federal disability discrimination law supplies a structurally different litigation pathway that has not yet been tried. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act reaches AI chatbot platforms as public accommodations under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), directly in circuits that do not require physical-place nexus and through the nexus theory in circuits that do. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act reaches the corporate hosts of these platforms through federal-assistance recipient pathways that vary in doctrinal strength. Microsoft Corporation is reached through Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, and National Center for Manufacturing Sciences assistance awards. The framework’s reach to the operative AI products does not depend on the strength of any corporate-host pathway, because Title III reaches those products as public accommodations independent of any federal-assistance pathway. Fitbit LLC is a direct Section 504 recipient through National Institutes of Health sub-grants and is the operator of the Gemini-powered Fitbit Personal Health Coach launched in October 2025, which reaches Google LLC’s AI model deployment through the subsidiary’s recipient status. Proposed pathways to Amazon’s and Apple’s health-care verticals are contingent on the relevant entity’s federal health-program participation. Title II of the ADA and Section 504(a)

Keywords

  • Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
  • ADA Title III
  • ADA Title II
  • AI chatbot liability
  • platform design
  • disability discrimination
  • meaningful access
  • reasonable modifications
  • engagement-maximizing design
  • Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller
  • clickwrap consent never formed
  • corporate-host recipient liability
  • deployer liability
  • principal engagement in health care

Plain language slides

First slide of the plain language summary of Civil Rights Pathways for AI-Induced PsychosisOpen the 22-slide summary (PDF)

Suggested citation

Gilly, Travis. "Civil Rights Pathways for AI-Induced Psychosis." Real Safety AI Foundation Legal Research Article, June 2026. https://realsafetyai.org/research/zh86ua/

Other versions

This paper is also posted on SSRN.

SSRN version

References (137)

This paper cites its sources in footnotes. Each authority is listed once, where it is first cited, with its footnote number.

  1. Footnote 1.Megan Garcia v. Character Technologies, Inc., No. 6:24-cv-01903 (M.D. Fla. filed Oct. 22, 2024).
  2. Footnote 2.Jody Godoy, OpenAI, Altman Sued Over ChatGPT’s Role in California Teen’s Suicide, Reuters (Aug. 26, 2025).
  3. Footnote 3.OpenAI, Addendum to GPT-5 System Card: Sensitive Conversations (Oct. 27, 2025)
  4. Footnote 3.OpenAI, Strengthening ChatGPT’s Responses in Sensitive Conversations (Oct. 27, 2025).
  5. Footnote 3.391:r2290, doi:10.1136/bmj.r2290 (Oct. 30, 2025).
  6. Footnote 4.The Garcia complaint, for instance, pleaded strict product liability, negligence per se, negligence, wrongful death and survivorship, loss of filial consortium, unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.204.
  7. Footnote 4.Garcia, 6:24-cv-01903 Second Amended Complaint (July 1, 2025).
  8. Footnote 5.Garcia v. Character Technologies, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1179 (M.D. Fla. 2025) (“not prepared to hold that [the LLM’s] output is speech”).
  9. Footnote 6.Garcia v. Character Technologies, Inc., No. 6:24-cv-01903 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2026) (Order)
  10. Footnote 6.Clare Duffy, Character.AI and Google Agree to Settle Lawsuits Over Teen Mental Health Harms and Suicides, CNN (Jan. 7, 2026)
  11. Footnote 6.Google and Character.AI Agree to Settle Lawsuit Linked to Teen Suicide, JURIST (Jan. 8, 2026).
  12. Footnote 7.42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189.
  13. Footnote 8.29 U.S.C. § 794.
  14. Footnote 9.42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)
  15. Footnote 9.29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).
  16. Footnote 10.Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295–302 (1985) (“thoughtlessness and indifference” standard for disability discrimination, with attention to unequal-treatment-versus-equal-treatment frameworks).
  17. Footnote 11.42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165.
  18. Footnote 12.29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
  19. Footnote 13.Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 215 (2022).
  20. Footnote 14.Garcia, No. 6:24-cv-01903 (M.D. Fla.).
  21. Footnote 15.Søren Dinesen Østergaard, Will Generative Artificial Intelligence Chatbots Generate Delusions in Individuals Prone to Psychosis?, 49 Schizophrenia Bull. 1418 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbad128
  22. Footnote 15.Søren Dinesen Østergaard, Generative Artificial Intelligence Chatbots and Delusions: From Guesswork to Emerging Cases, 152 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 257 (2025), https://doi.org/10.1111/acps.70022
  23. Footnote 15.H. Morrin et al., Delusions by Design? How Everyday AIs Might Be Fuelling Psychosis (and What Can Be Done About It), PsyArXiv (July 11, 2025), https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/cmy7n_v5.
  24. Footnote 19.Torrez v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. D-101-CV-2023-02838 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. verdict rendered Mar. 24, 2026).
  25. Footnote 20.K.G.M. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., JCCP No. 5255 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, verdict rendered Mar. 25, 2026).
  26. Footnote 26.42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
  27. Footnote 27.42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C)–(L).
  28. Footnote 28.H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990) (the ADA was intended to “keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of the times”)
  29. Footnote 28.H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 56 (1990) (same)
  30. Footnote 28.S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 56–60 (1989) (discussing technological accommodations and accessibility). see also Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 655–85 (2020).
  31. Footnote 29.Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)
  32. Footnote 29.Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
  33. Footnote 30.Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019)
  34. Footnote 30.Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
  35. Footnote 30.Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998)
  36. Footnote 30.Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
  37. Footnote 32.Torrez, No. D-101-CV-2023-02838.
  38. Footnote 33.cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017).
  39. Footnote 34.U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual §III-1.2000 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (“The examples given within each category are just illustrations” and the categories “should be construed liberally to afford people with disabilities equal access”)
  40. Footnote 34.28 C.F.R. §36.104
  41. Footnote 34.H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99–100 (1990) (House Committee Report confirming illustrative nature of enumerated examples).
  42. Footnote 35.Peter Lee et al., Benefits, Limits, and Risks of GPT-4 as an AI Chatbot for Medicine, 388 New Eng. J. Med. 1233 (2023) (discussing consumer AI service scope)
  43. Footnote 35.Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 399, 421–26 (2017)
  44. Footnote 35.Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating the Risks of AI, 103 B.U. L. Rev. 1347 (2023).
  45. Footnote 36.Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The core meaning of this provision, plainly enough, is that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space) that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1106 (2000).
  46. Footnote 37.Garcia, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 1179 (M.D. Fla. 2025).
  47. Footnote 38.Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024).
  48. Footnote 39.47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
  49. Footnote 40.Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–65 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Section 230 immunity unavailable where operator’s design solicits or requires the allegedly unlawful content)
  50. Footnote 40.Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021) (design-feature claims not barred by Section 230 where claims target operator conduct rather than third-party content).
  51. Footnote 42.42 U.S.C. § 12188(b).
  52. Footnote 43.42 U.S.C. § 12205.
  53. Footnote 45.Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
  54. Footnote 46.29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A)–(B).
  55. Footnote 47.Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
  56. Footnote 49.USAspending.gov, Microsoft Corporation federal award recipient profile, UEI INLWM5KDS7R9, accessible at https://www.usaspending.gov/recipient/dd77b7c3-663e-cb91-229f-5766a50e9b7f-P/all (last visited June 10, 2026).
  57. Footnote 50.Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (recipient status attaches to entities that receive federal financial assistance)
  58. Footnote 50.U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986) (entities that merely benefit from federal assistance are not recipients).
  59. Footnote 52.Scripps Research, “Scripps Research receives momentous award from NIH to lead key programs in national All of Us Research Program” (July 2023).
  60. Footnote 52.Scripps Research, “Through ‘All of Us’ program, Scripps Research launches wearable technology study to accelerate precision medicine” (Feb. 2021).
  61. Footnote 52.Caitlin P. Bailey et al., Fitbit Physical Activity and Sleep Data in the All of Us Research Program: Data Exploration and Processing Considerations for Research, 57 Med Sci Sports Exerc 2946 (Dec. 2025), doi:10.1249/MSS.0000000000003804.
  62. Footnote 53.Google, “Get a fuller picture with Fitbit’s personal health coach” (The Keyword blog, Mar. 19, 2026).
  63. Footnote 54.Google, “Fitbit’s personal health coach is now available in public preview” (The Keyword blog, Oct. 27, 2025), available at https://blog.google/products-and-platforms/devices/fitbit/personal-health-coach-public-preview/
  64. Footnote 54.Google Research Blog, “How we are building the personal health coach” (2025–2026 series)
  65. Footnote 54.TechCrunch, “Fitbit’s revamped app, with Gemini-powered health coach, rolls out to Premium users” (Oct. 27, 2025)
  66. Footnote 54.MobiHealthNews, “Google debuts Gemini-powered AI health coach for Fitbit and Pixel Watch users” (Oct. 2025).
  67. Footnote 56.31 U.S.C. §§ 6303–6305.
  68. Footnote 58.42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
  69. Footnote 59.Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)
  70. Footnote 59.Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
  71. Footnote 60.Doherty v. Bice, 101 F.4th 169, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2024)
  72. Footnote 60.J.W. v. Coweta Cnty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.4th 1309, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2024)
  73. Footnote 60.Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 169 F.4th 971, 977–79 (9th Cir. 2026).
  74. Footnote 61.Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 n.3 (2002).
  75. Footnote 62.Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
  76. Footnote 63.Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
  77. Footnote 64.Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
  78. Footnote 65.42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
  79. Footnote 66.42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
  80. Footnote 67.Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2414 (2023).
  81. Footnote 68.42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1).
  82. Footnote 69.89 Fed. Reg. (Dec. 19, 2025) (HHS proposed rulemaking on gender dysphoria, RIN 0945-AA27).
  83. Footnote 70.Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (reasonable modifications).
  84. Footnote 71.42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
  85. Footnote 72.Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284–93 (2001).
  86. Footnote 73.Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002).
  87. Footnote 74.Michelle H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (“to the degree the Section 504 … regulations … can be interpreted as a variety of meaningful access regulation, they will fall within the Section 504 implied cause of action,” distinguishing such regulations from the disparate-impact regulations at issue in Sandoval on the ground that meaningful-access regulations focus on “design” rather than “effect” and are best understood as construing rather than extending the statutory prohibition).
  88. Footnote 76.Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001) (deliberate indifference is “knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood”).
  89. Footnote 78.PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (individualized fundamental-alteration inquiry under Title III).
  90. Footnote 79.42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)
  91. Footnote 79.28 C.F.R. §36.303(a).
  92. Footnote 80.Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District, 701 F.3d 334 (11th Cir. 2012)
  93. Footnote 80.Payan v. Los Angeles Community College District, 11 F.4th 729 (9th Cir. 2021).
  94. Footnote 81.Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2002)
  95. Footnote 84.Malwarebytes, “ChatGPT under scrutiny as Florida investigates campus shooting” (Apr. 2026)
  96. Footnote 84.Florida Phoenix, “Uthmeier launches investigation into ChatGPT for role in FSU school shooting” (Apr. 9, 2026).
  97. Footnote 86.The Record, “Florida investigates OpenAI for role ChatGPT may have played in deadly shooting” (Apr. 2026).
  98. Footnote 88.Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (non est factum).
  99. Footnote 89.Cal. Fam. Code § 2251 (putative spouse doctrine)
  100. Footnote 89.Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 209.
  101. Footnote 92.Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014)
  102. Footnote 92.Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2016)
  103. Footnote 92.Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
  104. Footnote 93.Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Disability Impacts All of Us, https://www.cdc.gov/disability-and-health/media/pdfs/disability-impacts-all-of-us-infographic.pdf (last visited June 10, 2026).
  105. Footnote 94.Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010) (disputes over contract formation are for the court)
  106. Footnote 94.Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (challenges to the validity of the container contract go to the arbitrator).
  107. Footnote 95.Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 17, 19 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (mutual manifestations of assent requirement).
  108. Footnote 96.Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act), 15 U.S.C. §§7001–7031 (2024)
  109. Footnote 96.Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), enacted in 49 states and the District of Columbia
  110. Footnote 96.Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (online contract formation)
  111. Footnote 96.Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017) (clickwrap agreements).
  112. Footnote 97.Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
  113. Footnote 98.Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)(a)–(b) (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
  114. Footnote 99.Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460 (1969).
  115. Footnote 100.Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
  116. Footnote 101.Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63 (2019).
  117. Footnote 102.Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
  118. Footnote 103.Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (absence of meaningful choice together with contract terms unreasonably favorable to the other party).
  119. Footnote 104.9 U.S.C. § 2.
  120. Footnote 105.AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
  121. Footnote 106.Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018).
  122. Footnote 107.Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022).
  123. Footnote 110.Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992)
  124. Footnote 112.Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
  125. Footnote 113.Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 n.3 (2002) (“The ADA could not be clearer that the ‘remedies, procedures, and rights . . . are the same as the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in’ . . . the Rehabilitation Act. These explicit provisions make discussion of the ADA’s status as a ‘non Spending Clause’ tort statute quite irrelevant.” (internal citations omitted)).
  126. Footnote 116.Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq.
  127. Footnote 116.Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq.
  128. Footnote 116.N.Y. Exec. Law § 296
  129. Footnote 116.775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101 et seq.
  130. Footnote 117.The Unruh Act incorporates the ADA by reference, so an ADA Title III violation automatically constitutes an Unruh Act violation.
  131. Footnote 117.New York’s Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and Illinois’s Human Rights Act, 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101 et seq., supply analogous state-law remedies in their respective jurisdictions.
  132. Footnote 118.45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (HHS OCR complaint procedures).
  133. Footnote 119.34 C.F.R. pt. 100 (ED OCR complaint procedures).
  134. Footnote 120.28 U.S.C. § 1331.
  135. Footnote 121.28 U.S.C. § 1367.
  136. Footnote 123.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
  137. Footnote 129.Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).

All research