

No Ceiling, No Denominator, No Exit

Artificial intelligence and the architecture of American energy law

For half a century the United States has run a federal program to make machines use less energy. It has never once run a program to make the country use less energy. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act regulates efficiency, which is a ratio, and contains no authority to set a ceiling on aggregate consumption. That was tolerable while the ratio and the total moved together. Artificial intelligence has pulled them apart, and the gap is structural: it appears in coverage, in disclosure, and in allocation.

33×

down. The energy to answer a median Gemini text prompt fell by a factor of 33 in twelve months. The ratio improved.

+37%

up. In the same year the company's electricity demand rose 37 percent, the largest annual increase in its history. The total exploded.

| *Both numbers are true. The statute can read one of them. The mechanism is a fraction.*

PART II · COVERAGE

No Ceiling

The statute regulates a ratio and has no authority over the total. The coverage gate is a fraction with households in the denominator, so **a machine no household uses produces no quotient at all.**

PART III · DISCLOSURE

No Denominator

Google publishes watt-hours per prompt and withholds the prompt count. **The same epistemic move as the statute, arrived at independently.** The convergence is the finding.

PART IV · ALLOCATION

No Exit

Compute is financed by risk capital whose holders bear their losses; the grid by a rate base **residential customers cannot leave.** It survives demand arriving on schedule.

Three appearances of one structural gap between the ratio the law can see and the total it cannot.

No Ceiling

Fifty years of floors on efficiency, and not one line for the total

The best evidence that the household denominator does real work is what happened when the Department went looking for the data center in 2013.

Every metric in the statute attaches to a unit. None attaches to the aggregate.

The program sets floors on efficiency and, in some standards, caps on the rated energy use of **a single unit** under an assumed duty cycle, measured over "a representative average use cycle or period of use." The Secretary may not prescribe a standard that raises "the maximum allowable energy use" or lowers "the minimum required energy efficiency" of a covered product.

THE MISSING AUTHORITY

Nowhere does EPCA set, or authorize the Secretary to set, a limit on **how much energy a class of machines may consume in the aggregate**. The ratio-total distinction was invisible for fifty years because the two moved together.

A machine that no household uses does not produce a small quotient. It produces no quotient.

aggregate annual energy use
of products used by **households**

number of **households** that use them

MUST EXCEED 100 KWH · 42 U.S.C. § 6292(B)

Both terms are defined by household use, and the standard-setting gate at § 6295(l)(1) is metered the same way. **A data center rack contributes to neither the numerator nor the denominator.** The statute cannot compute the quantity it requires itself to find, so the fastest-growing electrical load in the country is invisible to it by construction, not by oversight.

To find the data center, the statute made the Department ask how much electricity a server draws in somebody's house.

In July 2013 the Department proposed to cover servers under Part A, the **consumer** program, the only door it chose to use. That required finding average annual per-household server use likely to exceed 100 kWh, so it "calculated average household energy use for computer systems... under the assumption that computer systems contain at least one computer or server," found individual servers draw roughly 1,900 to 2,100 kWh/yr, and cleared the bar.

AN ANSWER NO ONE COULD USE

Industry objected that the agency lacked authority over the commercial units. The Department **withdrew the determination in 2014, and no coverage determination for servers exists today.** The racks in the data centers were never in the calculation at all.

Federal law sets a floor on the machine that removes the heat, and no floor on the machines that make it.

Computer room air conditioners are covered equipment, regulated at 10 C.F.R. § 431.97, with every unit made on or after May 28, 2024 meeting a minimum. **The cooler is regulated; the servers it cools are not.** The obvious observation is available to anyone, and it is not the point.

THE POINT IS HOW IT GOT THERE

Congress never named computer room air conditioners. The Department built the category from a 1978 residual definition, establishing "additional categories... which EPCA did not expressly identify." **The same interpretive move is available for the server. The Department declined to make it.**

The industrial-equipment door has no numeric lock, and it is open.

Under § 6312(b) a server is "industrial equipment" on the face of the definition: it consumes energy in operation and is distributed for commercial use. To cover it the Secretary need only find doing so "necessary to carry out the purposes of this part," conserving "the energy resources of the Nation." **No kilowatt-hour figure to clear, no household to divide by, no aggregate threshold.**

WHY THE QUESTION SURVIVES JULY 2026

The determination still faces the ordinary constraints, a non-burdensome test procedure, a standard feasible and economically justified against the seven factors, substantial-evidence review. **The pending process rulemaking governs analytic method, not the coverage gate.**

No Denominator

The firm publishes the quotient and withholds the divisor. The convergence is the finding.

The aggregate is not merely unregulated. It is uncomputable by anyone outside the firms.

The same prompt, same hardware, same month: either 0.10 or 0.24 watt-hours, depending on what you count.

0.10

Wh, narrow convention: accelerators
only

0.24

Wh, comprehensive: host, idle,
overhead

Google published the first production per-prompt measurement, and it earns credit: the comprehensive figure cuts against the firm's interest. But a per-prompt figure is a **quotient**, and Google withholds the divisor. Its chief scientist, on the record: "*We're not comfortable revealing that for various reasons,*" because the firm wants users "thinking about the energy usage per prompt." In 2022 the same team reported ML "held steady at under 15%" of a denominator that has since roughly tripled.

No model-specific energy data since 2020. Into the vacuum, an outside estimate with no denominator to stand on.

OpenAI has released nothing model-specific since GPT-3; its CEO posted 0.34 Wh per query, unattached to any model. An outside lab estimated a GPT-5 response at **18.35 Wh on average and up to 40**, against 2.12 for GPT-4, from response times and assumed hardware. The 18-to-40 spread is "measurement doing what measurement does when the thing measured will not describe itself."

A TOTAL BUILT ON A BORROWED DIVISOR

Needing a denominator and having none, the analysts multiplied by 2.5 billion daily requests, **a figure from press reports, not OpenAI**, reaching roughly 45 GWh per day, the daily electricity of about 1.5 million U.S. homes.

A statute from 1975 and a firm from 2025 built the same blind spot from opposite directions.

THE STATUTE ASKS

"What does one machine draw per household per year?" It publishes floors on that quantity, and has **no line anywhere for the total.**

THE FIRM ASKS

"What does one prompt draw?" It publishes that quantity, and **withholds the count that would yield the total.**

A ratio is what an institution reports when it wants credit for improvement without accountability for scale, and efficiency is the only environmental progress compatible with unbounded growth.

No Exit

Compute is financed by risk capital. The grid is financed by a rate base no household can leave.

Not a prediction that the buildout will fail. It survives demand arriving exactly on schedule, which is why it is the right distinction.

In the fiber crash, the party that made the bet and the party that held the ticket were the same party.

The energy literature invokes 1990s fiber as a forecasting error. This Article draws nothing from the forecast, only from the financing. Carriers laid ~80 million miles of fiber on debt, and most sat dark for years. **The overbuilding lesson is unavailable here:** racks run at saturation, lead times are long, there is no evident dark capacity, and demand is arriving.

WHAT SPLITS THIS TIME

Then, carriers borrowed, built, and absorbed the loss themselves. Now the bet and the ticket come apart: **compute rides risk capital that bears its own losses; the grid rides a rate base households cannot leave.**

FERC "is not authorized to approve a pricing scheme that requires a group of utilities to pay for facilities from which its members derive no benefits, or benefits that are trivial in relation to the costs sought to be shifted."

Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.)

The inquiry is comparative and about **allocation, not merit**: a facility can be enormously valuable and still be misallocated. And "benefit" is a technical term, load flows and reliability, which is where the industry's move lives.

Stated modestly: no rate design is proposed and no allocation is called unlawful. But when a load is invisible, unbounded, and unquantifiable from public disclosure, **the allocation question cannot be answered by anyone outside the firms, because the inputs are held by the firms.**

A state metered the load directly, and the thing EPCA cannot see became visible in one session.

\$0.011

per kWh on all electricity consumed at each Virginia data center, utility-supplied and self-generated alike.

CAP \$600M/YR · SUNSETS JUNE 30, 2028

Signed June 30, 2026, effective the next day, in the largest data center market in the country, where no state had taxed data center electricity before. The decisive feature: **the gate is load.** Where EPCA meters by a household fraction a data center can never satisfy, Virginia meters by the kilowatt-hour actually drawn, and the load becomes visible the moment the unit is the thing you want to limit.

The Honest Version

Any version that suppressed these facts would be the version the industry would prefer to answer

The claim is jurisdictional and structural. It survives every concession, and the objections land on a discipline that cannot fix it.

Five concessions, stated plainly. The jurisdictional claim survives every one.

- 1 The racks are full.** Built capacity runs at saturation and accelerator lead times are long. No evident dark capacity.
- 2 Training burns power unwatched.** By design, and it sits outside Google's per-prompt accounting by that paper's own terms.
- 3 Most load is not AI.** A majority of data center load is conventional cloud computing, not AI inference.
- 4 Households don't pay the electrons.** Residential customers pay for shared infrastructure, capacity, and commodity.
- 5 The doctrine tolerates crude matching.** Where precision is unavailable, "if crude is all that is possible, it will have to suffice," and network benefit is presumed.

The claim is not that AI will break the grid or that current rates are unlawful. It is that the load is invisible, unbounded, and unquantifiable, and every concession leaves that intact.

DECOUPLING
"Efficiency already absorbed demand." It held until it did not: **Google's own +37% year is the break**, and the coverage gap does not depend on the total rising.

PLATEAU
"ML footprint will plateau then shrink." **The same authors' firm reported its largest load growth in history** four years later.

OVERESTIMATION
"Extrapolation error, like the 1990s." Accepted and not triggered: the fiber episode is used **for its financing structure, not its forecast**.

REBOUND
"Warmed-over Jevons." Set every elasticity to zero and Part II is unchanged: **a gate cannot be satisfied by a machine no household owns**.

A reader who files this Article under rebound has filed it under the discipline that cannot fix it.

The statute makes machines better. It was never given a provision that makes the country use less.

"Both numbers are true. The statute can read one of them. The mechanism is a fraction." The machines running the country's fastest-growing load are in no household, and contribute to neither term. The commercial door, which has no numeric lock, remains open.

No ceiling, no denominator, no exit. One structural gap between the ratio the law can see and the total it cannot, and a state has already shown that metering the load directly closes it.

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42 U.S.C. § 6313(a)(6).

42 U.S.C. § 6316(a).

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42 U.S.C. § 6293.

42 U.S.C. § 6306(b)(2).

42 U.S.C. § 6312(a)–(b).

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